Abstract: Why do people obey the law when it is not formally enforced? In this study, we explore the power of democracy as a behaviour channel of compliance with the law in a normative ambiguous context. Using a modified version of the taking game, we examine the effect of two distinct democratic interventions on stealing: a voting procedure in which the outcome is revealed and a voting procedure in which the outcome of the vote remains unknown. We find that revealing the outcome of a democratic vote significantly reduces stealing relative to a baseline treatment without a vote and treatment in which the outcome of the vote remains unknown. We also observe that participants expressing a vote against stealing are more likely to steal nonetheless when the outcome remains unknown. Our findings have important implications for the design of expressive law and democratic voting procedures.

The Democracy Premium in Expressive Law: An Experiment
- January 16, 2025
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- 2:30 pm
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- 4:00 pm
- ADCPS Conference Room
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